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Abstract 
Optimal planning of biodiversity conservation and habitat location is paramount for the cost-
effective implementation of nature and biodiversity conservation measures. Established approaches for 
land use planning and conservation site selection however might not be optimal in a world with 
changing climatic conditions. Generally, conservation organizations can choose one of two main 
governance modes: (1) buy land to implement conservation measures themselves on their land, or (2) 
compensate landowners for their voluntary provision of conservation measures on their land. We 
analyse in a conceptual ecological-economic simulation four different conservation site selection 
strategies in either of the two governance modes. Afterwards, we investigate the ecological and 
economic effectiveness of each governance-mode-strategy combination in a climatically changing 
environment, and in particular the influence of climate change characteristics. We show that the choice 
of the two governance modes and four patch selection strategies influences the cost-effectiveness of 
the implementation, generally suggesting that buying land, combined with the a species targeting 
patch selection strategy generates the highest cost-effectiveness. 
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1 Introduction 
Financial resources for biodiversity conservation projects are scarce. A cost-effective use of these 
resources – understood as maximising conservation goals for given financial resources or minimising 
financial resources to achieve given goals – is thus of utmost importance (Ando et al., 1998; Ferraro 
and Pattanayak, 2006). A growing field of research hence focuses on the cost-effectiveness analysis of 
biodiversity conservation policies (Ansell et al., 2016; Drechsler, 2017; Wätzold et al., 2016). 
Examples include studies on the cost-effective selection of habitat types (Petersen et al., 2016) and of 
land for conservation in an uncertain environment (Armsworth, 2018), on the cost-effective design of 
conservation payments (Drechsler et al., 2016, 2017), and on the empirical assessment of conservation 
contracts (Hily et al., 2015; Schöttker and Santos, 2019).  
A novel perspective regarding the cost-effective design of conservation measures is related to the 
question of governance (Schöttker et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2016). Applying Williamson’s analysis of 
the firm (Williamson, 1998, 1989) to biodiversity conservation, it is of interest how the conservation 
agency chooses among several alternative governance modes (GMs) representing different levels of 
vertical integration of conservation measure provision into the agency’s organizational structure. 
Following Schöttker et al. (2016), we assume that conservation agencies in principle have the choice 
between two GMs: (1) to buy land and implement biodiversity conservation measures on this land 
themselves, or through delegating the actual implementation to a contractor, e.g. a farmer (buy 
alternative), or (2) to compensate landowners for voluntary implementing conservation measures on 
their own land by offsetting implementation costs with a compensation payment (compensation 
alternative).  
Literature addresses aspects such as the conceptual analysis of optimal GM choice (Muradian and 
Rival, 2012), the development of ecological-economic models to assess the cost-effectiveness of 
different GM (Schöttker et al., 2016), specific conservation settings like forestry and corresponding 
GM options in developed (Juutinen et al., 2008) and developing countries (Curran et al., 2016), and 
cost assessments of specific GMs related to conservation projects (Schöttker and Santos, 2019; 
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Schöttker and Wätzold, 2018). These studies suggest a substantial impact of GM choice on the cost-
effective implementation of conservation policies.  
A key threat to global biodiversity, which has not been discussed in the context of cost-effective 
GMs, is climate change. According to Thomas et al. (2004) between 15% and 37% of species face a 
high risk of extinction due to climate change in sampled regions worldwide. Araújo et al. (2011) state 
that by 2080 58% of currently protected species in Europe will lose suitable habitat. In order to 
conserve biodiversity, the development of climate change compatible conservation strategies and 
policies is important (Heller and Zavaleta, 2009; Jones et al., 2016; Reside et al., 2018). However, 
most research in this field considers the ecological effectiveness of conservation policies (e.g. Zomer 
et al., 2015), and only a few studies analyse conservation policies from an economic perspective 
(Gerling and Wätzold, 2019; Hily et al., 2017; Lewis and Polasky, 2018; Mallory and Ando, 2014); 
and to our knowledge no study from the perspective of cost-effective GM. 
The purpose of this work is to contribute filling this research gap. We analyse the effects of GM 
choices on biodiversity and conservation costs against the background of variations in climatic 
conditions. Our background is species conservation in cultural landscapes. This implies that a 
conservation agency has to provide land with appropriate climate characteristics for a species but also 
that it has to ensure that specific conservation measures are carried out on that land (for example 
specific mowing or grazing regimes for endangered grassland birds, Wätzold et al. 2016). 
We develop a conceptual, spatially explicit ecological-economic model in a dynamic landscape. 
We calculate for the considered two GMs the cost-effectiveness of four different implementation 
strategies under climate change. These strategies include spatial targeting of conservation areas with 
respect to (a) implementation costs, (b) species abundance, (c) local climatic conditions and (d) 
climate change direction. The underlying ecological metapopulation model (Hanski, 1999) is used to 
determine the ecological benefit of the different GMs and site selection strategies. 
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In a Monte-Carlo simulation, we analyse the different GM options. The impact of varying model 
parameters is then assessed in sensitivity analysis, climatic characteristics such as spatial climate 
characteristics and climate change speed. 
 
2 The Model 
2.1 Landscape and conservation costs 
We assume a landscape with 10 × 20 = 200 equally sized, square patches 𝑖 (Table 1 provides an 
overview of all conceptual variables used in the model and Table 2 of all parameter values used in the 
computation). The landscape has a size of 10 patches in the east-west dimension and 20 patches in the 
south-north dimension (Fig. 1a). 
We assume Euclidean distances 𝑑𝑖𝑗 between the midpoints of patches 𝑖 and 𝑗, i.e. the distance 𝑑𝑖𝑗 
between patches (𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖) and (𝑥𝑗, 𝑦𝑗) is 𝑑𝑖𝑗 = √(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗)2 + (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗)2. Without loss of generality, we 
assume for the eight nearest patches a distance of one, equalling the minimum dispersal distance of the 
target species.  
Each patch in the landscape can potentially serve as a habitat for a target species under two 
conditions. First, each patch has a certain, time-dependent, climate suitability value, which determines 
to what degree the target species can find suitable habitat on the patch. Second, conservation measures 
need to be carried out on a patch 𝑖 in a specific time-step 𝑡 (𝑐𝑖,𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠  =  1). This causes opportunity costs 
of conservation of 𝑂𝐶𝑖 which are assumed to be constant over all time steps. If no conservation 
measures are carried out (𝑐𝑖,𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠  =  0) the patch may be used for economic purposes, e.g. intensive 
agricultural production, and no conservation costs arise.  
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Figure 1: (a) Spatially explicit landscape consisting of 10 × 20 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 including the 
climatically suitable zone (CSZ, shaded area) at time-steps 𝑡 = 0 and 𝑡 = 100, (b) climate suitability 
bell curves according to Eq. (1) in their respective base case parametrization (see Table 2) and 
climate suitability threshold 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟 = 0.5, leading to the CSZ at the different time steps 𝑡 ∈ {0,100}. 
The shaded area and the corresponding borders represents the CSZ at each given time-step. 
 
Conservation costs are spatially heterogeneous and follow a random distribution within a range of [𝑂𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜎𝑂𝐶 , 𝑂𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝜎𝑂𝐶], where 𝜎𝑂𝐶 is the standard variation and 𝑂𝐶̅̅ ̅̅  the mean conservation costs which 
equals 1. 
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Table 1: Overview and description of model variables. 
Variable name Variable description 𝐵𝑏𝑢𝑦 Budget for purchasing patches 𝐵𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑦 Budget to purchase land within a specific time-step 𝑡 𝐵𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 Budget to compensate landowners 𝐵𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 Budget to compensate landowners within a specific time-step 𝑡 𝑐𝑖,𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 Conservation status of patch 𝑖 𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 Total expenses to compensate a single patch 𝑖 for one time period 𝑐𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑦 Total expenses to buy a patch 𝑖 𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 Total amount of money received when selling a patch 𝑖 𝑐𝑠𝑖(𝑡) Climate suitability of patch 𝑖 at time-step 𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑗 Distance between patches 𝑖 and 𝑗 𝜀 Residual budget in the compensation alternative ℎ𝑖,𝑡 Dummy variable to indicate if a patch 𝑖 is colonized at time-step 𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑖,𝑡 Immigration rate into patch 𝑖 at time-step 𝑡 𝐾 All patches within the climatically suitable zone 𝑚𝑐𝑖 Monitoring costs of patch 𝑖 𝑂𝐶𝑖 Opportunity costs of conservation of patch 𝑖 𝑝𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑦 Purchasing price of a patch 𝑖 𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  Mean purchasing price of patches in the landscape 𝑆 Number of all climatically suitable patches that can be reached by 
dispersal of the target species from already occupied patches 𝜎𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑦 Standard deviation of purchasing prices 𝑡 Time-step 𝜏𝑖,𝑡 Colonization probability of patch 𝑖 at time-step 𝑡  𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑦 Transaction costs of purchasing a patch 𝑖 𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 Transaction costs to compensate the landowner of patch 𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) Coordinates of patch 𝑖 
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2.2 Climate Change 
The modelling of climate change is based on Hily et al. (2017) and we slightly adapted it to fit our 
simulation model. We assign a climate suitability value 𝑐𝑠𝑖(𝑡) ∈ [0,1] to each patch in the landscape, 
representing the probability with which habitat is provided if that patch is under conservation. Over 
time, the climate suitability of a patch 𝑐𝑠𝑖(𝑡) changes in every time-step 𝑡 such that 
𝑐𝑠𝑖(𝑡) =  exp (−(𝑗−𝜇𝑡)22×𝜌2 )         (1) 
with 𝜇𝑡 = 𝜌 + 𝑡 × 𝑗−2×𝜌𝑇  being the centre of the climate suitability bell curve at time-step 𝑡 ∈[1,100], 𝜌 an indicator for the bell shapes curvature and 𝑗 the y-coordinate of patch 𝑖. The bell-shaped 
climate suitability distribution in the landscape moves through the landscape from south to north (Fig. 
1b). 
A patch provides only suitable habitat for a target species, if the climate suitability of a patch at a 
specific point in time is larger than a threshold value (𝑐𝑠𝑖(𝑡) > 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟). Due to the general bell shape 
nature of the climate suitability in the landscape, the introduction of a climate suitability threshold 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟 generates a climatically suitable zone (CSZ), containing all patches in the landscape which are 
suitable for a target species’ habitat. Smaller (larger) values of 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟 generate a larger (smaller) CSZ 
by allowing the target species to colonize patches with lower (higher) climate suitability and the CA to 
set respective patches under conservation. The CSZ moves through the landscape form south to north 
over time, implying that the target species can only survive if it relocates northwards.  
2.3 Ecological Dynamics 
We assume the target species to populate the landscape and colonize new patches according to 
metapopulation dynamics (Hanski, 1999). The occupation of a patch by the target species depends on 
an immigration rate 𝐼𝑚𝑖,𝑡 of the species into that patch, an immigration threshold necessary for 
successful colonization 𝜃, and a resulting colonization probability 
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𝜏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐼𝑚𝑖,𝑡2𝐼𝑚𝑖,𝑡2 +𝜃2  if 𝑐𝑠𝑖(𝑡) ≥ 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟 and 𝑐𝑖,𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 1     (2) 
and 0 otherwise. The immigration rate is defined as 
𝐼𝑚𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑ ℎ𝑘,𝑡𝜈 exp(−𝑑𝑖,𝑘/𝛿)𝑆𝑡𝐾𝑘=1 ,        (3) 
with K being the number of all patches within the CSZ in principle available for colonization, ℎ𝑘,𝑡 
a dummy variable indicating if a patch 𝑘 is occupied at time 𝑡, 𝜈 the emigration rate from patch 𝑘, 𝑑𝑖,𝑘 
the distance between patches 𝑖 and 𝑘, 𝛿 the dispersal distance of the target species, and 𝑆𝑡 the number 
of climatically suitable patches in the neighborhood of patch 𝑘 (the neighborhood of a patch consists 
of all patches within the dispersal distance of the target species). By migrating from an occupied patch 𝑖 to an unoccupied patch 𝑗, the target species can colonize new habitat over time, while also facing the 
probability of extinction on already occupied patches. These colonisation and extinction processes 
generate dynamics in the metapopulation model.  
Climatic conditions are updated for each patch in every time step. With a northward shift of CSZ 
the climate suitability of patches at the southern end of the CSZ falls below the climate suitability 
threshold 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟 and these patches become unsuitable for the species. 
We calculate the overall share of simulation runs in which the target species goes extinct as an 
indicator for the ecological outcome of our model. Hence, increasing (decreasing) extinction risks 
reduce (increase) the cost-effectiveness of a selected GM and implementation strategy. 
2.4 Decision Problem of the Conservation Agency 
In order to reach a desired conservation outcome, a conservation agency (CA) implements certain 
conservation measures in the landscape. The CA chooses between two GMs: (1) buy land and 
implement conservation measures itself (buy alternative), or (2) pay landowners for their voluntary 
provision (compensation alternative) of equally designed conservation measures. For the 
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implementation of conservation measures, the CA has to develop a patch selection strategy (PSS) to 
decide which patches to conserve. We consider four strategies resulting for each of the two GM 
resulting in eight GM-PSS pairs. In the following, we first introduce the budget available for covering 
conservation costs and its allocation over time. We then explain how we model the two GMs and the 
corresponding budget equations, before we finally describe the four PSS. 
 Budget Comparability 
The implementation of conservation measures within a certain GM-PSS combination causes costs, 
which are covered by the agency’s budget. For all 8 GM-PSS pairs we assume equal available budgets 
at the beginning and the end of the simulation to allow comparability of the ecological outcomes and 
thus be able to assess the relative cost-effectiveness of the GM-PSS pairs.  
As the two different GM alternatives generate different cost streams, with high initial costs for 
buying and relatively high recurring costs for compensation, we assume that the present value (PV) of 
the two cost-streams has to be equal. The available budgets in each GM-PSS pair and each time-step 
thus differ and the relation of present values of the respective budgets, 𝑃𝑉(∑ 𝐵𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑇𝑡=0 ) =𝑃𝑉(∑ 𝐵𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑇𝑡=0 ), translates into : 
𝐵𝑏𝑢𝑦 =  ∑ 𝐵𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡=𝑇0 × 𝑑𝑡.         (4) 
𝐵𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 =  −𝑟×(𝐵𝑏𝑢𝑦×𝑟𝑇−𝜀)1−𝑟𝑇+1 ,         (5) 
with 𝐵𝑏𝑢𝑦 being the budget available for patch purchase, 𝑇 the length of the total timeframe (i.e. 
100 time-steps), 𝑟 the interest rate, and 𝜀 the residual budget at the end of period 𝑇 (necessary to keep 
the budgets for the two GMs comparable over the complete timeframe). The whole budget is available 
at the beginning of time-step 𝑡 = 0 for the buy alternative. For the compensation alternative, we 
assume that 𝐵𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 is set so that in each time-step 𝑡 an equal monetary amount (compensation annuity) 
is available for the CA to be spend, i.e. 𝐵𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 of eq. 8 (for a detailed explanation, see Appendix A4). 
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The CA conserves as many patches as possible for a given budget in a certain period 𝑡. Any leftover 
budget at the end of a period is transferred to the next period and added to the respective budget, 
including interest.  
 Buy Alternative 
The buy alternative characterizes the CA’s option to purchase and consecutively manage patches 
for conservation. The costs of an individual patch purchase are defined as  
𝑐𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑦 = 𝑝𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑦 +  𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑦,         (6) 
with 𝑝𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑦 = 𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ± 𝜎𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑦 being the uniform randomly distributed purchasing price, 𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑂𝐶̅̅ ̅̅𝑟  
the mean purchasing price of patches in the landscape, 𝜎𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑦 = 𝜎𝑂𝐶 × 𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  the standard deviation of 
purchasing prices, 𝑂𝐶̅̅ ̅̅  the mean conservation costs, 𝑟 the interest rate, 𝜎𝑂𝐶 the standard deviation of 
conservation costs. Transaction costs for purchasing a patch 𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑦 = 𝑡𝑐𝑏𝑢𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ±  𝜎𝑡𝑐 (such as notary 
fees, contract negotiation costs, legal counsel) are uniform randomly distributed. For simplicity, we 
assume that patch prices do not change over time. 
The CA is able to purchase new patches as long as the remaining budget is high enough. The CA 
is not allowed to have negative budgets, i.e. taking loans to fund patch purchase. We assume myopic 
spending behavior of the CA, thus strategically saving budget for later periods is not allowed. 
Purchased patches are managed in the prescribed conservation sense. Following Schöttker et al. (2016) 
we assume, that the costs of managing patches are equal to potential income generated from these 
measures, hence we need to consider only the costs of purchasing patches in the buy alternative. 
Depending on the chosen PSS species monitoring costs might occur. These are recurring 
monitoring costs of 𝑚𝑐𝑖 = 𝑚𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ± 𝜎𝑚𝑐 per patch in each time-step, with 𝑚𝑐̅̅ ̅̅  the mean monitoring costs 
and 𝜎𝑚𝑐 the variation bandwidth. Monitoring costs are initially drawn randomly, like transaction costs, 
from a uniform distribution (according to 𝑚𝑐̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝜎𝑚𝑐) and do not change over time.. 
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After a patch 𝑖 is purchased it is set under conservation, resulting in habitat generation on this 
patch, if climatic conditions for the target species on that patch are good enough, i.e. 𝑐𝑠𝑖(𝑡) ≥ 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟. 
Patch purchase then results in 𝑐𝑖,𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 1.  
We assume that in all four PSS the agency only purchases patches within the CSZ as 𝑐𝑠𝑖(𝑡) <𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟 for all patches outside the CSZ. We also assume that if an earlier purchased patch after some 
time falls out of the CSZ due to climate change, the CA sells the respective patch and receives the 
amount 
𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 = 𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 − 𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙.         (7) 
Following from the assumption that purchasing prices do not change over time, the CA receives 
the same amount from selling a patch as it paid for its acquisition (𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 = 𝑝𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑦). However, it has to 
bear the transaction costs, which are assumed to be equal for patch purchase and sale (𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 = 𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑦). 
 Compensation Alternative 
In the compensation alternative, the CA does not purchase areas for conservation, but offers a 
compensation payment to landowners to incentivize them to implement conservation measures 
voluntarily (equivalent to the measures in the buy alternative) on their land. Compensation payments 
are spatially homogeneous and are selected such that they equal the opportunity costs 𝑜𝑐𝑖 of the 
landowner who has the highest conservation costs of the participating landowners. 
For each patch under conservation, the CA has to pay 
𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 = 𝑜𝑐𝑖 +  𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝         (8) 
in every time period, resulting in a periodical payment subtracted from the budget in each time-step, 
with 𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 the transaction cost for each time-step for setting up and implementing a conservation 
measure (such as patch finding costs, contract negotiation, etc.). 
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After a patch is set under conservation (𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 1), it remains in that state for one time-step. In the 
next time-step, the CA renegotiates conservation contracts. Depending on the PSS, the CA might want 
to keep certain patches under conservation for more than one time-step, or wants to alter the 
conservation location according to its priorities (see Section 2.4.4). 
Comparable to the buy alternative, the CA also chooses potential conservation areas only within 
the CSZ. Hence, 𝑐𝑠𝑖(𝑡) ≥ 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟 for all patches under conservation. The periodically renewed 
conservation decision of the CA results in potentially varying locations of patches under conservation.  
 Patch Selection Strategies 
To implement conservation measures, the CA has to identify suitable patches. We consider four 
different PSS for this purpose (‘price prioritization’, ‘species abundance prioritization’, ‘climate 
suitability prioritization’, ‘climate change direction prioritization’). The first PSS is motivated purely 
by cost concerns, whereas PSS 2-4 follows the notion that prioritization of potential habitats based on 
natural processes and characteristics (here species abundance and general climate-related suitability of 
potential habitats) most likely provides a cost-effective conservation strategy (Reside et al., 2019). 
(1) ‘Price prioritization’ characterizes a PSS in which the CA prefers cheaper patches over more 
expensive ones. This translates for the CA, in case of the buy alternative, to buy the cheapest available 
patches in the CSZ. In case of the compensation alternative, the patches with the lowest compensation 
payment requests are added to the conserved patches (Fig. 2a). The resulting conservation patches do 
not necessarily consist of connected patches in which a target species can successfully migrate 
between patches under conservation, thus potentially inhibiting colonization. However, this PSS will 
generate the highest number of patches under conservation for a given budget. 
(2) For the PSS ‘species abundance prioritization’ the CA only buys or compensates patches, 
which are within the dispersal distance of colonized patches (Fig. 2b). This generates a cluster of 
conserved patches around existing habitat and leads to connected areas for the target species to 
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colonize. However, as not all patches are available for conservation, more expensive patches might 
have to be added leading to a lower number of conserved patches than with PSS ‘price prioritization’. 
Due to the need to identify colonized patches in this PSS, monitoring costs of 𝑚𝑐𝑖 = 𝑚𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ± 𝜎𝑚𝑐 arise 
for the CA in each time-step. 
 
Figure 2: Visualization of the four different PSSs and the corresponding patch location. (a) ‘Price 
prioritization’ allows for patch selection in the complete CSZ, only depending on the purchase price 
or compensation costs. (b) ‘Species abundance prioritization’ only selects patches within the dispersal 
distance of already occupied patches. (c) ‘Climate change prioritization’, prefers patches with higher 
climate suitability over patches with lower climate suitability, and (d) ‘Climate change direction 
prioritization’, prefers patches at the northern end of the CSZ over patches at the southern end of the 
CSZ. 
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 (3) We assume that the CA has full information of the climate suitability of all patches in the 
landscape. The PSS ‘climate suitability prioritization’ prefers patches with a high climate suitability 
(Fig. 2c), specifically, patches in the center of the climate suitability bell curve, as here the climate 
suitability value is highest. However, if only sufficiently cheap, also more northern or southern 
patches can be selected, allowing for a spatial spread of the conserved patches over the CSZ. By 
introducing a scaling factor 𝜆 (Eq. 7), we are able to foster or loosen this prioritization and thus either 
allow the CA to almost exclusively focus on the most centered patches (high 𝜆), or to allow a broader 
spread of patches as (for given climate suitability) less expensive but further away patches are selected 
(low 𝜆). In order to include costs into this PSS, we introduce the “suitability price” of each patch, 
which is a non-homogeneous payment, depending on a combination of the climate suitability of a 
patch and its opportunity costs. The “suitability price” includes both the (normalized) price and the 
(normalized) climate suitability of that patch as follows:  
𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 + 𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑡) × 𝜆,        (9) 
with 𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 the price of patch 𝑖 normalized on a scale of 0 to 1 (on which the cheapest patch price 
in the landscape is 0 and the most expensive price is 1), 𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑡) the normalized climate suitability 
of patch 𝑖 and 𝜆 the scaling factor. Instead of using only the price for patch selection (as in the PSS 
‘price prioritization’), now the suitability price is used as a selection criterion. Obviously, we use the 
regular price with respect to budgetary calculations. 
(4) Due to the CSZ’s movement into the northern direction over time, already selected and 
colonized patches move to the southern edge of the CSZ. By assuming that the CA has full 
information on the direction of climate change, we can design a fourth PSS in which the CA prioritizes 
patches closer to the northern edge of the CSZ (Fig. 2d). These patches will, due to the northward 
movement of the CSZ, stay in the CSZ for a long time with a high possibility of being colonized. The 
resulting conserved patches are comparable to the ones under the ‘climate suitability prioritization’, 
but biased towards northern patches. By introducing a scaling factor 𝜅 into this PSS, we can vary the 
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CA’s prioritization strength and either allow for a more or less strict patch selection close to the 
northern edge of the CSZ. Similar to the PSS ‘climate suitability prioritization’, we calculate a 
“suitability price” for each patch, which includes both the (normalized) price and the (normalized) 
climate suitability of that patch and represents a non-homogeneous payment to the individual 
landowners:  
𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 + 𝑐𝑠𝑧𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑤(𝑡) × 𝜅,        (10) 
with 𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 the price of patch 𝑖 normalized on a scale of 0 to 1 (on which the cheapest patch price 
in the landscape is 0 and the most expensive price is 1), and 𝑐𝑠𝑧𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑤(𝑡) the normalized row number in 
which within the CSZ a certain patch 𝑖 is located (more northern patches have higher row numbers and 
thus higher 𝑐𝑠𝑧𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑤(𝑡) leading to the intended prioritization). 
 
3 Analysis 
For model analysis we apply a Monte-Carlo-simulation, in which each parameter set – i.e. selected 
combinations of parameters specified in Table 2 – is simulated 2000 times to allow an analysis of the 
whole bandwidth of potential outcomes and to avoid randomly extreme results resulting from the 
model inherent stochasticity. A simulation run refers to one single calculation of the model for one 
parameter set. 
The parameters 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟, 𝜌, 𝑚𝑡, and 𝜃 influence the shape of the climate bell curve, and thus have 
potentially an effect on both GM and all PSS. In contrast, 𝜆 and 𝜅 affect the prioritization strength of 
the two climate sensitive PSS, and hence may only influence the outcome of these PSS. The economic 
parameters 𝑂𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑡𝑐𝑏𝑢𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, and 𝑚𝑐̅̅ ̅̅  impact the different cost measures, while the interest rate 𝑟 is used for 
discounting and budget calculations in all GM-PSS pairs. 𝜎𝑂𝐶, 𝜎𝑡𝑐𝑏𝑢𝑦, and 𝜎𝑚𝑐 determine the range of 
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all randomly drawn cost parameters in the simulation. The ecological parameters 𝜈 and 𝛿 influence the 
dispersal ability of the target species affecting the ecological dynamics in all GM-PSS pairs. 
Table 2: Overview and description of parameters and parametrization values specified for 
computation of the Monte-Carlo-Simulation and the sensitivity analysis.  
Parameter 
name 
Parameter description Parametrization Value 𝑖 Patch index ∈ [1,200] 𝜇𝑡 Centre of the climate suitability bell curve at time-step 𝑡 1 𝜎𝑂𝐶 Standard deviation of opportunity 𝑂𝐶̅̅ ̅̅  0.1 𝜎𝑡𝑐 Standard deviation of transaction costs 0.01 𝜎𝑚𝑐 Standard deviation of monitoring costs 0.01 𝜃 Immigration threshold for successful colonization 5 
   
Economic parameters   𝑂𝐶̅̅ ̅̅  Mean opportunity costs in the landscape 1.0 𝑡𝑐𝑏𝑢𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ Mean transaction costs of purchasing a patch 1.0 𝑚𝑐̅̅ ̅̅  Mean monitoring costs 0.1 𝑟 Interest rate 0.03 
   
Ecological Parameters   𝜈 Emigration rate from any patch 100 𝛿 Dispersal distance of the target species 1 
   
Climate Parameters Value Range Base case 𝑇 Maximum number of time steps ∈ {50,100,150} 100 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟 Climate suitability threshold ∈ {0.3,0.5,0.7} 0.5 𝜌 Curvature of the climate suitability bell shape ∈ {2,3,4} 2 𝜆 Scaling factor for PSS ‘climate suitability prioritization’ ∈ {1.5,2.0,4.0} 2.0 𝜅 Scaling factor for PSS ‘climate change direction 
prioritization’ 
∈ {1.5,2.0,2.5} 2.0 
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We calculate a reference base case with a respective base case parametrization, which was 
selected to resemble economic, ecological, and climatic conditions, which allow the model to generate 
inherently consistent outcomes (see Table 2). Afterwards, we individually vary some parameters in 
specified ranges to values lower and higher than the base case value to identify the impact of each 
parameter on the cost-effectiveness of each GM-PSS pair (sensitivity analysis). 
 
4 Results 
We first present the results of the base case parametrization of the eight GM-PSS pairs as it 
already provides valuable and general insights into the choice of the cost-effective GM. To identify 
factors influencing the relative performance of the eight GM-PSS pairs, we then present results of a 
sensitivity analysis in which climatic model parameters are varied individually. The analysis of the 
results revealed four effects influencing the cost-effectiveness of each GM-PSS pair. Wätzold and 
Drechsler (2014) have identified already two of the effects – the patch restriction effect and the 
connectivity effect –, while the remaining two effects – the climate prioritization effect and the 
flexibility effect – are newly identified in this work. In particular, the effects are:  
(1) The patch restriction effect, which exists as due to the limitation of eligible patches, if 
connected habitat network requirements or certain climate suitability restrictions are to be met 
by a specific GM-PSS pair. In these cases, most likely more costly patches are to be selected 
compared to a situation in which the CA can freely choose patches in the whole CSZ. 
Therefore, a restriction of eligible patches tends to increase conservation cost and hence to 
reduce cost-effectiveness.  
(2) The connectivity effect, as with improved connectivity of conserved patches, the ecological 
outcome increases, and hence the cost-effectiveness increases.  
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(3) The climate prioritization effect, which leads to improved ecological conditions of patches 
under conservation as they are chosen in climatically more suitable areas within the CSZ.  
(4) The flexibility effect, which exists as due to the selected GM, the adaptability of the 
conservation network (e.g. to changing climatic conditions) can be fast (for the compensation 
alternative) and slow (for the buy alternative). This adaptation possibility increases 
conservation costs, but allows for a flexible selection of suitable patches and hence increases 
ecological outcome. The net effect depends on the respective GM-PSS pair. 
4.1 Scenarios 
In the following, the influence of changes in climatic parameters on the cost-effectiveness and 
extinction probabilities of the different GM-PSS pairs is analysed. Results of the influence of 
ecological and economic parameters are found in Appendix A4. 
 Climate Change Speed 
The cost-effectiveness of three GM-PSS pairs was influenced by variations of climate change 
speed, i.e. variations of the overall simulation timeframe 𝑇. A short timeframe (small 𝑇) represents 
fast climate change as it takes less time steps for the climate suitability to vary and the CSZ to move 
across the landscape (Fig. 3).  
Generally we find that patch selection in the compensation alternative is more flexible compared 
to the buy alternative. Patches can be reselected anew in every time step in the compensation 
alternative, depending on patch price, climate suitability and occupation status, while they are fixed 
for a longer time (until they are no more in the CSZ) in the buy alternative and thus cannot react to 
changing climatic conditions or occupation status. Hence, a strong flexibility effect exists which causes 
improved ecological outcome in the compensation alternative compared to the buy alternative.  
For the ‘price prioritization’ strategy (Fig. 3a), we find that the cost-effectiveness of the 
compensation alternative decreases with increasing climate change speed whereas it remains constant 
20 
 
 
for the buy alternative. We explain this result with the combination of a generally reduced ecological 
suitability of the landscape for the target species due to faster climate change, and the counteracting 
flexibility effect. In the compensation alternative, reduced ecological suitability and a strong patch 
restriction effect outperform the flexibility effect compared to the buy alternative, and hence lead to a 
reduced cost-effectiveness. In contrast, in the buy alternative the stability of the selected conservation 
network compensates the negative ecological effects of fast climate change on the cost-effectiveness. 
Furthermore, prioritizing patches by price generally results in more patches under conservation as 
cheaper areas are selected, which at the same time are not necessarily well connected 
Increasing climate change speed, however, increases the cost-effectiveness of the ‘species 
abundance prioritization’ strategy for the buy alternative in comparison to the compensation 
alternative (Fig. 3b). This result is somewhat surprising, as this strategy prioritizes patch selection 
around already existing habitat and hence allows for easy migration to new nearby habitat. Differences 
in climate change speed should not interfere with this effect. An explanation may be that the 
connectivity effect is increasingly relevant with increasing climate change speeds, which also would 
explain, why the other strategies result in increasing extinction rates, as there the connectivity effect is 
less pronounced. Against the background of more volatile conservation networks in the compensation 
alternative, it is however unclear why no cost-effectiveness reduction can be observed in the ‘species 
abundance prioritization’ strategy in the compensation alternative. 
We do not observe any influence of changing climate change speed on the extinction probability 
and hence cost-effectiveness in the ‘climate suitability prioritization’ strategy in any of the two GMs 
(Fig 3c). A possible explanation is that conserved patches are located in well-functioning conservation 
networks in case of the buy alternative, or adapt quickly enough to location changes of the CSZ in 
case of the compensation alternative, so that eventually extinction rates are not affected. 
Moreover, we find faster climate change speed increases extinction rates in the ‘climate change 
direction prioritization’ strategy for the buy alternative, and hence a decrease in cost-effectiveness of 
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the GM-PSS pair compared to the compensation alternative (Fig 3d). This result is expected as the 
period when patches are located inside the CSZ is reduced with a shorter timeframe. This is especially 
true for this strategy, which prioritizes patches at the northern-edge of the CSZ that stay in the CSZ 
longer compared to other PSS. Within the compensation alternative, for every parameter setting the 
survival rates are at 100%, indicating a strong flexibility effect, which leads to increased survival rates. 
 
Figure 3: Changes in extinction rates due to changes in maximum length of the simulation 
timeframe T, (i.e. climate change speed decreases with increasing T). (a)-(d) represent the extinction 
probabilities for all four strategies in the buy and compensation alternative. 
 
 Strength of climate prioritization 
Within the PSSs ‘climate suitability prioritization’ and ‘climate change direction prioritization’, 
patch selection takes place according to either climate suitability or climate change direction. We 
introduced a scaling factor 𝜆 for each strategy to define the strength of prioritization of respective 
patches. A higher 𝜆 (𝜅) results in a stronger prioritization for climate suitability (climate change 
direction) relative to patch prices. Thus, increases in either parameter generate a patch restriction 
effect and climate prioritization effect by narrowing the spatial extent of the conserved patches in the 
respective strategies. Changes in 𝜆 only affect the ‘climate suitability prioritization strategy’, and 
changes in 𝜅 only affect the ‘climate direction prioritization strategy’. The ‘prize prioritization 
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strategy’ and the ‘species abundance prioritization strategy’ remain unaffected, as both parameters do 
not alter their respective patch selection mechanism.  
We did not find any influence of the climate suitability scaling factor 𝜆, neither in the buy nor the 
compensation alternative within our parameter range (compare graphical analysis in Appendix A4). 
This is somewhat surprising as increasing values of 𝜆 cause a prioritization of patch selection in the 
center of the CSZ, and hence have a patch restriction effect and climate prioritization effect. Both 
effects are probably cancelling each other out in their influence on the cost-effectiveness.  
However, changes in 𝜅 do show an influence on the cost-effectiveness of the ‘climate change 
direction prioritization strategy’ for the buy alternative, while the compensation alternative remains 
unaffected (see Fig. 4d). Low values of 𝜅 (low prioritization for climate change direction) result in an 
increased cost-effectiveness compared to larger values of 𝜅 due to the high connectivity effect. With 
increasing 𝜅 newly added patches are predominantly located in the most northern part of the CSZ 
while large portions of the CSZ remain unconsidered for selection. Hence, conserved patches are 
spread far across the complete CSZ, resulting in large distances between conserved patches and 
leading to an increase in extinction probability with increasing 𝜅, and hence a reduction of cost-
effectiveness. For lower values of 𝜅 however, new patches are selected in a larger proportion of the 
landscape, hence are more likely located closer to already occupied patches, which results in better 
migration possibilities and increased cost-effectiveness. Also, with larger (smaller) parts of the CSZ 
eligible for patch selection with smaller values of (larger) 𝜅, the patch restriction effect becomes 
weaker (stronger), hence also increasing (decreasing) the cost-effectiveness. 
We did not find any influence on the compensation alternative strategies by variations in 𝜅. A 
possible explanation is the interplay between connectivity effect and flexibility effect in either 
alternative. Due to repeated reselection of new patches in the prioritized area they are relatively well 
connected in the compensation alternative, compared to the wide spatial spread in the buy alternative, 
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leading to relatively good migration possibilities and hence a better cost-effectiveness of the 
compensation alternative, compared to the buy alternative. 
 
Figure 4: Influence of changes in 𝜅 on the extinction probability in the buy alternative and the 
compensation alternative for each of the four PSSs.  
 
 Climate suitability threshold 
Changes in the climate suitability threshold value 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟influence the cost-effectiveness of four 
GM-PSS pairs (Fig. 5). The value of the climate suitability threshold 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟 determines the width of the 
CSZ and hence has potentially an effect due to the connectivity and patch restriction effects. Generally 
speaking, with an increasing CSZ (low 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟) the connectivity effect weakens, while the patch 
restriction effect is decreasing for all GM-PSS pairs.  
We find with increasing CSZ size (decreasing 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟) for both GMs in the ‘price prioritization 
strategy’ (Fig 5a) a decrease in cost-effectiveness suggesting that the patch restriction effect dominates 
the connectivity effect. However, the reduction of cost-effectiveness in the compensation alternative is 
stronger than in the buy alternative. This effect may be explained as the size of the CSZ and hence the 
number of eligible patches increases with decreasing 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟. For the compensation alternative, more 
volatile patch selection (compared to the buy alternative) causes frequent changes of habitat location 
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(potentially every period), and hence reduces migration possibilities as selected patches are potentially 
far apart. This effect is especially prominent in the ‘price prioritization strategy’ as patches are purely 
selected based on compensation costs and hence will be selected randomly across the whole CSZ. In 
other strategies (see details below), patch selection is restricted to a more narrow area within the CSZ, 
leading to a more compact conservation network and hence decreased extinction probabilities, 
compared to the ‘price prioritization strategy’.  
In the ‘species abundance prioritization strategy’ however, only the cost-effectiveness of the buy 
alternative decreases with increasing 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟 (see Fig. 5b). A decreasing size of the CSZ due to 
increasing 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟 limits the CA to purchase patches nearby already occupied patches. If a CA wants to 
select further patches within this strategy, it would be necessary to select patches outside of the 
dispersal distance of the target species and which thus could not be colonized in the current time step 
(though they would still be connected to the habitat network). Hence, a decreasing connectivity effect 
causes a reduction of the cost-effectiveness in the ‘species abundance prioritization strategy’ in the buy 
alternative. A higher flexibility effect in the compensation alternative positively contributes to the 
cost-effectiveness compared to the buy alternative. This impact is not present in the buy alternative.  
In the ‘climate suitability prioritization strategy’, no negative effect occurs with a decreasing 
climate threshold on the cost-effectiveness of both GMs within the chosen parametrization range (Fig 
5c). Our explanation is that the patch restriction and connectivity effect cancel each other out. 
A strong negative effect on cost-effectiveness can be observed for small values of 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟 (large 
CSZ), in the ‘climate change direction prioritization strategy’ (Fig. 5d) for the buy alternative, while 
no effect can be seen in the compensation alternative. This may again be explained by a combination 
of the connectivity effect and the climate prioritization effect. While patches remain under 
conservation in the buy alternative as long as they are located within the CSZ, this duration grows, as 
well as the resulting gaps between conserved areas and unoccupied patches, with a decrease in 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟, 
eventually leading to a lower cost-effectiveness. In the compensation alternative, patches under 
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conservation in contrast might be reselected anew if they are unoccupied at the end of the time step. 
Reselection then happens in the northern part of the CSZ, automatically locating newly added patches 
close to other patches in the conservation network, hence leading to low extinction probabilities and 
high cost-effectiveness. 
Generally, compensation alternative strategies perform well even with large CSZs because of the 
flexibility effect with the exception of the ‘price prioritization strategy’, in which the flexibility effect is 
counteracted by a small connectivity effect. 
 
Figure 5: Extinction probabilities of the different GM-PSS pairs with changing climate threshold, 
resulting in changing CSZ< sizes. 
 
 Shape of the climate suitability bell curve 
We only find small effects of variations in 𝜌 (influencing the curvature of the climate suitability 
bell shape) on the cost-effectiveness of the GM-PSS pairs. A possible reason might be that the climate 
suitability bell shape determines the climate suitability in the complete landscape, while only a 
relatively narrow strip around the center (which the CSZ covers) is actually eligible for patch 
selection. Because changes in the curvature of the bell shape are not necessarily very strong within the 
CSZ and only have marginal effects on CSZ size, the effects on GM-PSS pairs performances is 
negligible (compare graphical analysis in Appendix A4). 
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5 Summary and Discussion 
The purpose of this paper was to analyse with a conceptual model the impact of changes in climate 
parameters on the cost-effectiveness of different governance modes (GM) and specific implementation 
strategies (PSS). We assume that conservation agencies (CA) have two alternative GM to select. (1) 
Buy conservation areas and implement conservation activities on this land (buy alternative), and 
compensate private landowners for their voluntary provision of conservation measures on their own 
land (compensation alternative). We further assume that the CA chooses from four PSS. (1) Select the 
cheapest patches in the landscape (‘price prioritization’), (2) select patches close to areas already 
populated by a target species (‘species abundance prioritization’), (3) select patches with highest 
climate suitability (‘climate suitability prioritization’), and (4) select patches which remain 
climatically suitable for the longest time (‘climate change direction prioritization’). 
We wish to highlight the following two general key insights. First, buying areas for conservation 
produces a relatively rigid spatial selection of conserved patches due to the long-term commitment for 
certain conservation areas within the landscape. While more rigid patch location improves the 
ecological effectiveness by e.g. reducing habitat turnover it does not allow swift adaptation to 
changing climatic conditions. In contrast, the compensation alternative is more flexible, i.e. patches 
are potentially changing their conservation status more often as compensation contracts are typically 
only valid for short time periods (cp. also Gerling and Wätzold, 2019). More specifically, differences 
in flexibility result in a higher possibility of the compensation alternative to adapt to changing 
conditions and thus being a more robust choice against uncertain and changing climatic conditions 
than the buy alternative. 
Second, we find that against the presence of changing climatic conditions, the cost-effectiveness 
of GM strongly depends on the choice of the PSS. In this context, to buy conservation areas yields a 
higher cost-effectiveness against changing climatic conditions when focusing on the cheapest available 
conservation sites (i.e. applying the ‘prize prioritization strategy’), while private landowner 
compensation seems to be more cost-effective with more specific PSS (i.e. the ‘species abundance 
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prioritization’, ‘climate suitability prioritization’ or ‘climate change direction prioritization’ strategy). 
While purchasing areas for conservation typically generates high up-front and one-off costs, the 
resulting areas should stay under conservation for as long as possible. Prioritizing cheaper patches 
then allows for an increase in total conservation areas as more patches can be selected, which in turn 
improves the ecological outcome and increases cost-effectiveness. Given the advantages in terms of 
flexibility of the compensation alternative, a more specific site selection by prioritizing either 
ecological or climatic characteristics has a stronger influence than in the buy alternative and, hence, 
price prioritization is comparatively less relevant.  
In designing the ecological-economic model, we made several simplifying assumptions, which 
deserve discussion. We only considered two GMs, which are polar types of governance structures and 
ignored hybrid GMs. For example, a CA might split its budget and spend part of it to buy areas and the 
rest on compensation contracts with landowners. By doing so, benefits of both GMs might be 
combined (e.g. fixed location of purchased patches with ecologically beneficial effects, and flexibility 
of compensated areas with fast adaptability to changing climatic conditions). However, to what extent 
this happens and what other effects occur is a matter of further research. 
We further assumed that landowners are willing to sell their land or take part in compensation 
contracts as long as the monetary benefits from participation exceed the costs. Some authors question 
the assumption that landowners are always willing to sell their land and suggest strategies to optimally 
time the purchase of land for reserves in insecure ecological and economic conditions (Costello and 
Polasky, 2004; McDonald-Madden et al., 2008), and with changing land prices (Dissanayake and 
Önal, 2011). Moreover, literature suggests factors which influence the general willingness to 
participate in compensation schemes (e.g. contract duration and flexibility, land productivity, and farm 
size; cp. Greiner (2016) and Unay-Gailhard and Bojnec (2016)), and indicate that the willingness to 
participate may also be reversed due to e.g. cost-related learning effects (Frondel et al., 2012). A 
reduced willingness to participate would directly increase the costs of conservation projects, as more 
costly areas would have to be chosen. In addition, the ecological effectiveness might be reduced, as 
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less suitable patches might have to be selected or due to increased habitat turnover (cp. Schöttker et 
al., 2016). Ultimately, both effects negatively influence the cost-effectiveness of the corresponding 
GM. However, more research is required to understand which GM is likely to suffer from higher cost-
effectiveness losses of modified assumptions on landowners’ behaviour.  
We also assumed that conservation costs in the landscape are constant over the complete 
timeframe and unaffected by the CA’s behaviour. By assuming constant costs we ignore any kind of 
strategic behaviour, for example from landowners by overstating conservation costs to achieve higher 
payments or a higher price if they intend to sell their land (Banerjee et al., 2016; Gerling and Wätzold, 
2019; Kuhfuss et al., 2016). A strategic overstatement of conservation costs could increase patch 
prices in both GMs, in turn reducing their cost-effectiveness. Further research is necessary to 
understand which GM is more prone to strategic behaviour and how to design possible mechanisms to 
reduce it. 
We further assumed that the CA is allowed to sell patches in the buy alternative, as patches which 
are no longer in the CSZ for a specific species do not provide any more suitable habitat for this 
species. Thus, the potentially regained budget by selling these patches can be utilized to purchase new 
patches at more suitable locations. It has to be mentioned however that selling conserved land may not 
be possible in reality for a CA due to legal restrictions regarding the permanence of conservation areas 
(Schöttker and Wätzold, 2018). 
The conceptual nature of our model limits the possibility for direct policy implications of our 
results. Nevertheless, our model improves the general understanding of the influence of climate 
change on the cost-effective choice of GMs for biodiversity conservation. We show that the cost-
effectiveness of GMs and PSS may be influenced by changing climatic conditions and thus policy 
makers are advised to explicitly include climate change concerns in their design. The availability of 
respective conservation strategies to allow for specific targeting of species or climatic conditions is 
important in this context.  
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In addition, the more flexible or more rigid character of conservation networks due to different 
GMs and the resulting implications on cost-effectiveness should be accounted for in the decision about 
the optimal GM choice. Similarly, dependent on climatic characteristics, the optimal choice for CA 
may vary, as may the optimal choice of PSS.  
Further research may investigate the topic of this work with more empirical data in real 
landscapes. Climate models are able to provide precise estimations about future climate developments 
on a regional level, species-specific ecological models are able to assess the impacts of conservation 
measures in a changing climate and the development of scenarios about future costs is feasible. Such 
models and data may be combined in empirical climate-ecological-economic models providing policy 
makers with important recommendations about cost-effective GM and PSS choices. We hope our 
model motivates such future work and provides a useful basis for it.  
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Appendix 
A1 Distance Calculation 
We define the distance between the midpoints of any two patches 𝑖 and 𝑗 as follows: 
𝑑𝑖𝑗 = { 1 𝑖𝑓: |𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗| = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗| = 1√(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗)2 + (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗)2 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗    (A1) 
 
Figure F1: Distance between two patches calculated by Eq. (A1). The yellow-shaded and red-
framed area represents the climatically suitable zone (CSZ). The blue- shaded area represents a patch 
selected for conservation; the star-symbol indicates that this patch is occupied by the target species. 
Numbers indicate the distance of the respective patch to the highlighted blue patch. Note that the 
distance for all patches directly neighbouring the blue patch is 1. 
We chose this method of distance calculation, as it seems agreed upon in the literature and is 
relatively easy to handle in the implementation of the model. The exception made for the distance of 
diagonally neighbouring patches to calculate as 1 instead of √2 results in an overestimation of species 
dispersal, especially if the dispersal distance of a species is only 1. Without this exception, in this case 
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a dispersal would only be possible to vertically and horizontally neighbouring patches but not to the 
diagonally neighbouring ones, causing distortions and model artefacts. 
A2 Patch Selection Strategies 
 
Figure A2: ‘Prize prioritization strategy’. The red-framed area represents the climatically 
suitable zone (CSZ), within which the orange-shaded area represents patches eligible for patch 
selection in the ‘prize prioritization strategy’. The blue-shaded area represents a patch selected for 
conservation; the star-symbol indicates that this patch is occupied by the target species. 
Figure A2 illustrates a conservation network in the model landscape, created by the ‘prize 
prioritization strategy’. Within the CSZ potential conservation areas are located. Patches marked with 
a star are patches occupied by the target species. 
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Figure A3: ‘Species abundance targeting strategy’. The red-framed area represents the climatically 
suitable zone (CSZ), within which the orange-shaded area represents patches eligible for patch selection 
in the ‘species abundance targeting strategy’. The yellow-shaded areas represent patches, which are 
non- eligible for selection in this strategy. The blue shaded area represents a patch selected for 
conservation; the star-symbol indicates that this patch is occupied by the target species. 
Figure A3 illustrates a potential conservation network generated by a ‘species abundance targeting 
strategy’. Conservation areas are clustered together around occupied patches. Patches eligible for 
future extension (i.e. newly bought or compensated areas) represent all patches within the dispersal 
distance of the target species. All yellow shaded areas, although within the CSZ, are outside the 
dispersal distance of the target species and thus not eligible for conservation 
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Figure A4: ‘Climate suitability prioritization strategy’. The red-framed area represents the 
climatically suitable zone (CSZ), within which the orange-shaded area represents patches eligible for 
patch selection in the ‘climate suitability prioritization strategy’. The degree of orange depicts the 
level of eligibility of a particular patch; darker-shaded areas have a higher eligibility than lighter-
shaded areas. The blue shaded area represents a patch selected for conservation; the star-symbol 
indicates that this patch is occupied by the target species. 
Figure A4 visualizes a habitat network created by a ‘climate suitability prioritization strategy’. 
Patches cluster around the centre of the CSZ, representing the area with highest climate suitability for 
the target species. Due to the closer proximity of conservation area location, the complete network has 
a higher degree of connectedness, and the target species is more likely to be able to migrate to other 
conservation areas in the network, compared to the price prioritization strategy (Fig. A2). For 
simplicity, we ignored the eligibility differentiation made in combination of climate suitability and 
conservation opportunity costs per patch as described and used in the simulation model, and only 
depicted the climate differentiation aspect here. 
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Figure A5: ’Climate change directional prioritization strategy’. The red-framed area represents 
the climatically suitable zone (CSZ), within which the orange-shaded area represents patches eligible 
for patch selection in the ’climate change directional prioritization strategy’. The degree of orange 
depicts the level of eligibility of a particular patch; darker-shaded areas have a higher eligibility than 
lighter-shaded areas. The blue shaded area represents a patch selected for conservation; the star-
symbol indicates that this patch is occupied by the target species. 
Figure A5 illustrates the ‘climate change direction prioritization strategy’. This strategy locates 
newly generated patches in the more northern range of the CSZ compared to the ‘climate suitability 
prioritization strategy’. Patches selected closer to the northern border of the CSZ are located within the 
CSZ for the longest time. This is due to the northwards propagation of the CSZ through the landscape 
as a result of climate change. If a patch close to the northern border is selected for conservation, it 
takes longer for the CSZ to move across this patch and to eventually drop out of the CSZ, compared to 
a patch closer to the southern border which drops out of the CSZ earlier. This results in a generally 
more stretched out conservation network as patches can potentially be located throughout the whole 
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CSZ, while being added most likely at the norther edge, compared to the climate suitability 
prioritization strategy. 
A3 Patch restriction effect 
 
Figure A6: Patch restriction effect in the ‘species abundance prioritization strategy’ due to 
changes in CSZ sizes due to varying 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟. The red-framed area represents the climatically suitable 
zone (CSZ), within which the orange-shaded area represents patches eligible for patch selection in the 
‘species abundance prioritization strategy’. The degree of orange depicts the level of eligibility of a 
particular patch; darker-shaded areas have a higher eligibility than lighter-shaded areas. The blue 
shaded area represents a patch selected for conservation; the star-symbol indicates that this patch is 
occupied by the target species. The red-shaded areas represent patches which could have been 
selected by the respective strategy, if the CSZ was large enough, but in fact are restricted in eligibility 
by the patch restriction effect. 
Decreasing the climate suitability threshold parameter 𝑐𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟 leads a decreasing extend of the CSZ 
(see Fig A6.a; visualized for the ‘species abundance prioritization strategy’). In any strategy, this can 
lead to an exclusion of otherwise potentially eligible patches from the selection mechanism. The result 
is a patch restriction effect (see main paper, Section 4) leading to an increased necessity to select 
patches in the remaining (smaller) CSZ, which in consequence are likely to be more expensive. 
Additionally, a connectivity effect can be observed, as the selected patches are closer together in case 
of a smaller CSZ and thus more likely to be well connected. 
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A4 Influence of economic and ecological variables 
Additional to the sensitivity analysis for changes in climatic model parametrization presented in 
Section 4 of the main paper, we performed a sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in ecological 
and economic parameters, presented in the following. The corresponding parameter values can be seen 
in Table A1. 
Table A1: Overview about the parametrization value and value ranges specified for computation 
of the Monte-Carlo-Simulation and used in the sensitivity analysis for non-climatic factors. 
Parameter 
name 
Parameter description Parametrization Values Range Base case 
 
   
Economic parameters   𝑂𝐶̅̅ ̅̅  Mean opportunity costs in the landscape ∈ {0.8,1.0,1.2} 1.0 𝑡𝑐𝑏𝑢𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ Mean transaction costs of purchasing a patch ∈ {0.8, 1.0, 1.2} 1.0 𝑚𝑐̅̅ ̅̅  Mean monitoring costs ∈ {0.08, 0.10, 0.12} 0.1 𝑟 Interest rate ∈ {0.01, 0.015, 0.02,  0.025,0.03, 0.035, 0.04, 0.045, 0.05} 0.03 
   
Ecological Parameters   𝜈 Emigration rate from any patch ∈ {90,100,110} 100 𝛿 Dispersal distance of the target species ∈ {1,2,3} 1 
 
Regarding the impact of interest rates on the cost-effectiveness of the different GM-PSS pairs we 
find that with decreasing interest rates, the cost-effectiveness is reduced in all GM-PSS pairs. These 
result is expectable, as reductions in the parameter eventually decreases the CA’s possibility to buy or 
compensate new patches, either by reducing their available budgets or by increasing patch prices or 
compensation requirements through increases in the discount factor (compare Schöttker et al. 2016). A 
graphical analysis can be found in Figure A7. 
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Figure A7: Extinction probabilities of the different GM-PSS pairs with changing interest rates, 
resulting in changes in available budgets and discount rates. The red line represents results for the 
buy alternative, the green line for the compensation alternative. 
A direct increase of patch prices (by increasing 𝑂𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ) has a negative effect on the cost-effectiveness 
of the GM-PSS pairs (see Figure A8). 
 
Figure A8: Extinction probabilities of the different GM-PSS pairs with changing mean 
opportunity costs. The red line represents results for the buy alternative, the green line for the 
compensation alternative. 
Variations in the emigration rate (𝜈) did not result in observable changes of the extinction rates of 
the GM-PSS pairs (Fig. A9), and increasing the dispersal distance (𝛿) slightly reduced the extinction 
rate of the buy alternative’s ‘climate change direction prioritization strategy’, while the other GM-PSS 
pairs remained unaffected (Fig. A10).  
43 
 
 
 
Figure A9: Extinction probabilities of the different GM-PSS pairs with changing emigration rates. 
The red line represents results for the buy alternative, the green line for the compensation alternative. 
 
Figure A10: Extinction probabilities of the different GM-PSS pairs with changing dispersal 
distances. The red line represents results for the buy alternative, the green line for the compensation 
alternative. 
Decreasing land purchase related mean transaction costs 𝑡𝑐𝑏𝑢𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ only showed an influence on the in 
the climate direction prioritization strategy where cost-effectiveness increases (see Fig. A11). Other 
strategies where not influence by changes in mean transaction costs as the underlying model 
parametrization already resulted in complete species survival and no changes in cost-effectiveness 
where observable. 
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Figure A11: Extinction probabilities of the different GM-PSS pairs with changing mean 
transaction costs. The red line represents results for the buy alternative, the green line for the 
compensation alternative. 
Similarly, a decrease in mean monitoring costs resulted in an increase in cost-effectiveness as 
general conservation costs where reduced (Fig. A12). 
 
Figure A12: Extinction probabilities of the different GM-PSS pairs with changing mean 
monitoring costs. The red line represents results for the buy alternative, the green line for the 
compensation alternative. 
As discussed in the main part, changes in the parameter 𝜌, influencing the curvature of the climate 
suitability bell shape, can be considered negligible (see Fig A13). Variation in 𝜌 only influences the 
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size of the CSZ and the absolute values of patch level climate suitability within the CSZ. These effects 
however are only marginal. 
 
 
Figure A13: Extinction probabilities of the different GM-PSS pairs with changing climate 
suitability bell curvature parameter 𝜌. The red line represents results for the buy alternative, the green 
line for the compensation alternative. 
Variations in the climate direction prioritization strength parameter 𝜆 only have an effect on the 
respective PSS (compare Figure A14). In particular, a marginal increasing effect on the cost-
effectiveness of the buy alternative due to decreases in 𝜆 can be observed. The direction of this effect 
is reasonable, as a decreasing value of 𝜆 results in a less restrictive and thus less costly patch selection 
within the CSZ. This in turn increases the cost-effectiveness of the corresponding GM-PSS pair. 
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Figure A14: Extinction probabilities of the different GM-PSS pairs with changing climate 
direction prioritization strength 𝜆. The red line represents results for the buy alternative, the green 
line for the compensation alternative. 
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